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The Physician’s Right to Due Process In 
Public and Private Hospitals: Is There a 
Difference? 
by Arthur F. Southwick, J.D., M.B.A. 
This article will discuss the rights of 
a licensed physician to acquire and re- 
tain a hospital medical staff appoint- 
ment. The focus of the discussion will 
be the relationship between the inde- 
pendent fee-for-service private prac- 
titioner and the community general 
hospital. The relationship of the or- 
ganized medical staff to both the hospi- 
tal and the individual doctor will also be 
clarified. The hospital involved in this 
discussion may be owned by a gov- 
ernmental unit and hence identified as 
a “public hospital,” but more likely it 
will be aprivate, non-profit charitable 
corporation and will be referred to as a 
“private” hospital. Specifically, this 
article will explore the differences, if 
any, between a physician’s rights vis- 
a-vis the public hospital and his or 
her rights when a private hospital is 
involved. 
Excluded from this analysis are 
situations where the doctor is an em- 
ployee of a hospital or health care in- 
stitution. Also excluded are cases 
involving hospitals which limit their 
service to particular patients (e.g., 
the mentally ill or children), and 
university-owned teaching hospitals 
that impose a faculty appointment in 
the medical school as a pre-requisite to 
staff privileges. 
In order to understand the basis for 
the hospital‘s concern in appointing or 
re-appointing physicians to its medical 
staff, it is important to realize that the 
hospital, as a legal entity, bears the ul- 
timate responsibility for the standards 
of clinical practice exercised by its en- 
tire professional staff. The hospital‘s 
governing board (typically refemd to 
as the board of trustees) has a duty to 
the institution’s patients to exercise 
reasonable care in the appointment and 
retention of the independent, fee-for- 
service uhysicians on their medical 
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staff. Failure to do so can result in 
liability.’ 
The hospital’s duty to exercise rea- 
sonable care in the selectiun and reten- 
tion of independent medical practition- 
ers is separate and distinct from the 
hospital’s vicarious liability for patient 
injuries resulting from malpractice 
committed in the institution. Torts 
committed by an employee while carry- 
ing out or furthering the business of the 
employer impose liability on both the 
employee and the employer. The em- 
ployee is liable because he or she vio- 
lated a legally protected interest of the 
injured third person; the employer is li- 
able because it had the legal right, in 
theory, to control the means and 
methods of the employee’s work.* 
Such vicarious liability is found in 
the familiar doctrine of respondear 
superior.) The basis of the doctrine is, 
simply, public policy. It facilitates col- 
lection of compensatory damages from 
a presumably financially responsible 
party (the employer) while encouraging 
the employer to supervise and regulate 
more closely the activities of its 
employees. 
In contrast to vicarious liability is 
the hospital’s direct duty to the patient 
to use due care in the appointment of 
independent physicians to its medical 
staff. When patients sue for a brcach of 
this duty, it is not necessary to allege 
and prove that an employment relation- 
ship exists between the hospital and the 
physician, nor is it necessary to prove 
that the doctor’s negligence was within 
the scope of his or her employment. 
Rather, the patient need only allege and 
establish that the hospital was negligent 
in appointing or re-appointing the doc- 
tor to the medical staff or granting him 
or her privileges, and that this negli- 
gence was the proximate cause of in- 
jury or damage to the patient. If the 
hospital knew or ought to have known 
that the physician appointed to its staff 
was incompetent, then liability will at- 
tach. Breach of this duty is sometimes 
referred to as c o p r a t e  negligence or 
institutional liability. 
care in granting staff privileges to 
physicians cannot be delegated to the 
organized medical staff, to the local 
medical society, or to any other group 
or individual. The hospital‘s board of 
trustees may not abdicate its legal 
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In the exerdse of the hospital govern- 
hg board’s duty to use reasonable care 
in appointing phydrkar to its m e d i d  
corded a p p l h t s  for stntr appointments 
or dinial privileges mast adhere to sob- 
stantive and procedural due proeeao. It 
is the view of thb autbor that tbt duty of 
the governing board in mdering ded- 
dons with respect to stpnappdntments 
and in delineating dinlepl privileges 
is the same for public and private 
hospitals. 
stan, tho rights and procedures E 
duties regarding management of the in- 
stitution, whether in business or clini- 
cal affairs. It has been suggested that 
the governing body, which may be 
composed primarily or even entirely of 
lay persons, is incapable of making 
judgments with respect to matters of 
professional competence, and, accord- 
ingly, that decisions regarding a p  
pointment of medical staff and delinea- 
tion of privileges for individual physi- 
cians should be made by physicians. 
Law-making bodies, whether the 
courts or the legislatures. have decided 
emphatically to the contrary on the pol- 
icy that responsibility must be vested in 
the governing board.* The board, how- 
ever, may delegate to the medical staff 
the authority to make recommen- 
dations with respect to staff appoint- 
ments and clinical privileges, but the 
role of the medical staff is limited to 
such advice and recommendation. The 
board must retain responsibility for 
such decisions.J 
In the exercise of this duty, how- 
ever, the rights and procedures ac- 
corded applicants for staff appoint- 
ments or clinical privileges must adhere 
to substantive and procedural due pro- 
cess. It is the view of this author that 
the duty of the governing board in ren- 
dering decisions with respect to staff 
appointments and in delineating clinical 
privileges is the same for public and 
private hospitals.6 
Requirement for Due Process 
Over 50 years ago, the United 
States Supreme Court held that a 
licensed physician does not have a con- 
stitutional right to a medical staff a p  
pointment, even when the hospital in- 
volved is public.7 However, when the 
hospital in question is a public or gov- 
ernmental hospital, the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution 
comes into play. The Fourteenth 
Amendment provides that ‘‘ . . . no 
state [shall] deprive any person of life, 
liberty, or property, without due pro- 
cess of law; nor deny to any person . . . 
the equalprotection of the laws [em- 
phasis supplied].” It must, however, be 
stressed that the Fourteenth Amend- 
ment is not applicable in the absence of 
state or governmental action. Private 
parties, including hospitals, are con- 
stitutionally required to extend due 
process or equal protection only when 
they are so closely involved with gov- 
ernmental interests as to be considered 
engaged in “state action.”* 
Where “state action” can be estab 
lished, a hospital must extend both 
substantive and procedural due process 
as well as equal protection to a physi- 
cian who makes an initial application 
for appointment to the medical staff 
and to a current member of the staff 
subject to disciplinary a ~ t i o n . ~  Sub 
stantive due process creates and d c  
fines rights and duties relative to the 
legal relationship between the hospital 
and the physician. The issue arises 
when property or other rights are 
directly affected by “state action.” 
Substantive due process and equal 
protection require the hospital to act 
reasonably, non-capriciously, non- 
arbitrarily, and consistent with a per- 
missible objective. Procedural due pr& 
cess relates to the method and means 
by which substantive rules are made 
and administered. It requires a hospital 
to utilize a fair procedure when imple- 
menting and enforcing its rules and 
regulations. More will be said about 
substantive reasonableness and pro- 
cedural fairness later in this article. 
What can constitute “state ac- 
tion?” The Fourth Circuit Court of A p  
peals has expressed the view that the 
receipt by the hospital of substantial 
amounts of federal funds entitled 
physicians seeking medical staff a p  
pointments to equal protection of the 
law.lo On the other hand, the Second 
Circuit has a f f i i ed  a lower federal 
court ruling that held that a private 
hospital, which revoked a physician’s 
privileges upon his plea of guilty in a 
criminal assault proceeding, was not 
engaged in “state action.”I’ According 
to the Second Circuit, state action suf- 
ficient to entitle the doctor to constitu- 
tional protection is present only in the 
extremely limited situation where (a) 
government involvement with the pri- 
vate hospital is significant. (b) state ac- 
tivity causes the alleged injury to the 
doctor, and (c) the state aids, encour- 
ages, or connotes approval of the activ- 
ity.’* In applying this three-pronged 
standard, the Second Circuit held that 
government does not aid or approve the 
activity nor cause the iqjury simply by 
providing funding to the hospital or by 
its regulation of the institution through 
licensure, certificate of need legisla- 
tion, or other controls.13 The court 
further stated that a private hospital is 
not performing a public function when 
it appoints physicians to its medical 
staff.“ 
Several sources of law are Imposing 
requirements ofreasonableness upon the 
private hospital that are essrntinlly 
equivalent to tbe amstitatbnnl stan- 
dards applicable to public hospitals or 
those private hospitals deemed involved 
in state actbn. 
Other Sources of Doe Rocem Protection 
Constitutionally, public hospitals 
must grant due process and equal pro- 
tection to physicians applying for an 
appointment to the medical staff and to 
current members of the staff being sub- 
jected to disciplinary proceedings. 
Most courts that have addressed this 
issue, however, have held that private, 
non-profit hospitals need not accord 
physicians these rights. Thus, the due 
process rights of physicians vis-a-vis a 
hospital do differ depending upon the 
public or private ownership of the in- 
stitution. Many commentators have 
suggested that this dichotomy is neither 
just nor equitable, since both public 
and private hospitals serve the same 
community. Additionally, several 
sources of law are imposing require- 
ments of reasonableness upon the pri- 
vate hospital that are essentially equiv- 
alent to the constitutional standards 
applicable to public hospitals or those 
private hospitals deemed involved in 
state action. These include: (a) the fed- 
eral Conditions of Participation; Hos- 
pitals that apply to hospitals participat- 
ing in the Medicare program.l3 (b) the 
Standards of the Joint Commission on 
the Accreditation of Hospitals,16 and 
(c) a number of state court decisions.I7 
Each of these legally binding stan- 
dards requires a private hospital to act 
reasonably and to accord procedural 
fairness when appointing and disciplin- 
ing its medical staff. The Conditions of 
Participation in the Medicare program 
establish the criteriafor the selection of 
medical staff as individual character, 
competence, training, experience, and 
judgment. These criteria are contained 
in federal regulations that have the 
force of law.’* Similarly, the Standards 
of the Joint Commission on Accredi- 
tation of Hospitals require that the 
appointment or re-appointment of 
physicians, the “specific delineation of 
clinical privileges, and, the periodic in- 
depth reappraisal of each staff mem- 
ber,” be conducted on the basis of the 
“individual’s training and/or experi- 
ence, current competence, professional 
ethics, and, ifrequested, health 
status.”‘* 
Similarly, several state court deci- 
sions have held that a private, non- 
profit hospital must grant physicians 
the essence of substantive and pro- 
cedural due process on the basis of 
public policy and the common law, 
notwithstanding the lack of a constitu- 
tional mandate. This trend was inaugu- 
rated in 1%3 when the New Jersey 
Supreme Court held that a private hos- 
pital could not arbitrarily refuse to con- 
sider the application of an osteopathic 
physician, especially where it was the 
only medical institution in the commu- 
nity.20 The court reasoned that the hos- 
pital was vested with a public interest 
and possessed a fiduciary relationship 
to patients and to members of the med- 
ical community. In short, the court held 
that a private, non-profit hospital is not 
truly “private” in the classical sense of 
being allowed to deal with licensed 
physicians on whatever basis or criteria 
it wishes. Rather, as an institution open 
to and serving the public, it must act 
reasonabiy and non-arbitrarily in ap- 
pointing and retaining medical staff and 
must utilize a fair procedure for 
evaluating a physician’s credentials. 
The New Jersey case has, in es- 
sence. been adopted and followed by 
courts in a number ofjurisdictions.21 
”he red& is *&it the range of the hospi- 
tal‘s discretion in appointing physicians 
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to its medical staff has been narrowed, 
while the rights of physicians have been 
expanded by a standard of reasonable- 
ness and a recognition that physicians 
are entitled to a fair evaluation of their 
credentials and competence. 
It should be noted that in other con- 
texts the law has equated the duties of 
public and private health care institu- 
tions. For example, public and private 
hospitals that maintain an emergency 
room may not refuse to see a patient 
who comes to the facility seeking 
emergency care relying upon the hospi- 
tal‘s representation that it is equipped 
and staffed to provide such care.’* 
Similarly, all hospitals that have re- 
ceived federal financial assistance di- 
rectly or supplemental to the Hill- 
Burton Act must provide a certain 
volume of free care to patients unable 
to pay.” Various sources of law (con- 
stitutional, statutory, and administra- 
tive regulation) at both the state and 
federal level of govemment prohibit 
hospitals and other institutions serving 
the public from discriminating with re- 
spect to accommodations, services, or 
privileges on the basis of race, color, 
creed, national origin, and, in some cir- 
cumstances, sex.” Lastly, many states 
have rejected the application of the 
doctrine of sovereign immunity which 
resulted in public hospitals being im- 
mune from tort liability, just as courts 
earlier overturned the doctrine of 
charitable immunity which resulted in 
private, non-profit hospitals no longer 
being immune from tort liability. The 
Michigan Supreme Court, for example, 
held in 1960, that it would impose tort 
liability on a charitable hospital,Z’ and 
in 1978, rejected governmental immu- 
nity for a public hospital even though 
such immunity was granted by statute 
to any governmental agency performing 
a “governmental function.” For the 
purpose of tort liability to its patients, 
the Michigan court held that the owner- 
ship and operation of a hospital was not 
in the category of a “governmental 
function” sufficient to support a dif- 
ference between private and public 
hospitals. 26 
Accordingly, both as a matter of de- 
veloping law and sound managerial pol- 
icy, all hospitals, public or private, 
should implement policies observing 
the essence of both substantive and 
procedural due process. All hospitals 
should serve their respective patient 
and physician communities in accor- 
dance with uniform, reasonable, and 
non-discriminatory standards regard- 
less of whether they are public or pri- 
vate. Fairness and logic, as well as the 
trend in the law, would seem to suggest 
that all hospitals should be held to the 
same standards when appointing 
physicians to their medical staffs or 
when delineating clinical privileges. 
R.oreasional Standards 
and Institutional Objectives 
Those who resist the view that 
licensed physicians are entitled to due 
process and equal protection need not 
fear that the hospital will be without 
adequate means to control and monitor 
the competence of its staff. Courts 
have generally upheld as reasonable 
and non-arbitrary any rule or standard 
bearing a rational relationship to pro- 
fessional standards of patient care, 
the objectives of the hospital, or the 
character and ethical behavior of the 
individual physician. As regards pro- 
fessional standards, courts have sus- 
tained hospital by-laws requiring spe- 
cific documentation of credentials 
upon application to the hospital,27 
delineation of clinical specialty 
privileges,” the monitoring and con- 
trolling of staff and sum- 
mary suspension from the staff ifpa- 
tient care is threatened and provided 
such action is followed by a timely 
hearing.30 
to the objectives of the institution will 
be upheld as reasonable. For example, 
hospitals may requin all staff physi- 
cians to carry adequate malpractice in- 
surance in order to maintain the fiscal 
integrity of the hospital.31 Similarly, a 
hospital can deny appointment on the 
basis that bed space in a certain de- 
partment or on a particular service is 
limited, or on the ground that a suffi- 
cient number of certain specialists are 
currently on the staff.32 To illustrate, a 
New Jersey court held that a hospital 
could deny staff appohtments to two 
qualified surgeons upon evidence that 
surgical coverage at the hospital was al- 
ready adequate, that additional sur- 
geons would likely increase the number 
of surgeries performed, and that the 
needs of the patient community would 
not be served by additional surgeries.’J 
Such decisions by the governing body 
must, of course, be documented by 
credible evidence. A blanket mom- 
torium on all staff appointments, 
especially if enforced inconsistently, 
will be found to be arbitrary and 
~nreasonable.~~ 
Courts have generally sustained ex- 
clusive service contracts entered into 
by both public and private hospitals so 
long as they are reasonable and non- 
Similarly, rules that rationally relate 
arbitrary, and even though they tend to 
restrict appointments to a medical 
staff. In such arrangements, the hospi- 
tal contracts with a group of physicians 
for the provision of specialized profes- 
sional services, thereby closing the 
service to all other physicians regard- 
less of their qualifications and compe- 
tence. Older cases had no hesitation 
in approving exclusive contracts for 
radiology and pathol~gy,~’ and more 
recent cases have upheld such agree- 
ments for cardiac catheterization, nu- 
clear medicine, and renal hemodialy- 
 is.^^ In each case, the hospital was 
able to show valid reasons, e.g., en- 
hancement of patient care standards, 
improvement of teaching programs, or 
administrative efficiency, for its deci- 
sion to enter into an exclusive contract. 
Not all hospital by-law provisions 
are, however, upheld and certain rules 
have been struck down as being unrea- 
sonable, arbitrary, and without any ra- 
tional relationship to either standards 
of patient care or institutional objec- 
tives. For example, requirements that 
all persons appointed to the medical 
staff be members of the county medical 
society or some other named profes- 
sional group have been reje~ted,’~ as 
have been vague and ambiguous rules 
stating that clinical privileges could be 
reduced “in the best interests of the 
hospital and its  patient^."^^ Similarly, a 
requirement that the doctor’s office be 
located in the same county as the hospi- 
tal was rejected.39 A rule that required 
each applicant to the staff to supply 
two references from current members 
of the staff,’O and a requirement of a 
governmental hospital in rural Tennes- 
see (where there were only six physi- 
cians practicing in the entire county) 
that persons granted major surgical 
privileges be certified by the American 
Board of Surgery or be eligible for cer- 
tification?’ were held as unreasonably 
related to institutional objectives. 
By-law provisions thafprovide for 
the exclusion of an entire class of per- 
sons authorized by local law to perform 
limited health care functions, for 
example, podiatrists or physician’s as- 
sistants, may also be rejected as unrea- 
sonable and contrary to public policy.42 
If local law grants such individuals 
rights of limited practice, then it fol- 
lows that hospitals that are required to 
act reasonably and non-arbitrarily 
vis-a-vis the medical or osteopathic 
physician, should also be required to 
act reasonably with respeci to the lim- 
ited pra~titioner.~~ It is not required 
that full clinical privileges be granted 
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to a practitioner of the healing arts. 
Rather, hospitals should be required to 
evaluate fairly, objectively, and based 
upon reasonable criteria applications 
for privileges by legally recognized 
practitioners.u This requires evalua- 
tion of the individual‘s training, experi- 
ence and competence in relationship to 
standards of patient care and institu- 
tional objectives. 
One of the more perplexing current 
issues is the extent to which a hospital 
can go in denying a staff appointment 
or in disciplining a member of its staff 
for personal behavior considered con- 
trary to generally accepted ethical, so- 
cial, and m o d  mores. One thing is cer- 
tain: hospital counsel must have a 
precise set of facts in order to succeed 
in a move to deny or withdraw staff 
privileges. However, a physician’s 
wrongful conduct in the past may not 
per se be a proper basis for denying a 
current application for appointment. 
The applying physician carries the bur- 
den of providing evidence of his or her 
reformation and rehabilitation, and 
when his or her references fail to pro- 
vide this evidence, the hospital may 
deny the app~intment.‘~ Moreover, the 
“good character, qualifications, and 
standing” of the applicant physician 
are legitimate and justifiable areas of 
inquiry provided that they are applied 
fairly and that there is evidence at the 
hearing that the physician lacked either 
physical or social fitne~s.‘~ “lntolera- 
ble personal behavior” consisting of 
frequent use of unacceptable language 
and rude behavior in the presence of 
patients and visitors has been held suf- 
ficient to dismiss a physician from the 
staff.” Likewise, a physician’s failure 
to document his “adherence to the 
ethics of [his] profession, [his] good re- 
putation and [his] ability to work with 
others,” as required by the hospital’s 
medical staff by-laws, was found to be 
a proper basis for rejecting his applica- 
tion for appointment to the staff.“ 
A recent California case, however, 
has held that a requirement that appli- 
cants for staff privileges be able to 
work with others must be reasonably 
related to standards of patient care. If 
an applicant is rejected, the hospital 
must be prepared to show that his or 
her inability to “work with others” 
presented a “real and substantial 
danger that patients . . . might receive 
other than high quality medical 
care.”49 Vague and ambiguous by-law 
provisions that are susceptible to arbi- 
trary or discriminatory implementa- 
tion, such as a provision requiring a p  
plicants to be “temperamentally and 
psychologically suited for cooperative 
staff-functions,” have also been re- 
jected by the courts.sa 
is attempting to take away or diminish a 
physician’s privileges, the notice of 
charges against the doctor must be suf- 
ficiently specific to allow him or her to 
answer. Additionally, in order that the 
Procedurnl Due Process 
It is often more important to accord 
physicians procedural due process than 
it is to be unduly concerned about 
whether or not a given standard or 
criterion is “reasonable and non- 
arbitrary” as a matter of substance. 
This is because, practically, the denial 
ofprocedural fairness is more likely to 
generate hostility and actual litigation 
by an aggrieved physician. Physicians 
can better understand a substantive 
rule they do not agree with than they 
can accept procedural arbitrariness 
concerning their application for staff 
privileges. Also, it is easier for the 
physician’s attorney to attack the pro- 
cedure by which his or her client was 
denied a medical staff appointment or 
subjected to discipline than it is to at- 
tack the merits of the rule or require- 
ment. Thus, as a matter of “preventive 
law,” it is advisable for private hospi- 
tals to grant the essence of procedural 
due process to current members of 
the staff as well as to new applicants, 
whether or not the law of the particular 
jurisdiction actually mandates due pro- 
cess. Moreover, hospitals accredited by 
the Joint Commission are required to 
adhere to procedural due proces~.~’ 
What is procedural due process? 
Simply, but accurately, stated as a mat- 
ter of constitutional law, it is fundamen- 
tal fairness under all the facts and cir- 
cumstances. The specific elements of a 
fair procedural evaluation of a physi- 
cian’s qualifications and competence 
may thus differ depending upon time, 
place, and circumstance. 
The minimal requirements of pro- 
cedural due process have been articu- 
lated as follows: The physician is enti- 
tled to: (1) written notice of reasons for 
denial of appointment or of the charges 
against him or her; (2) an opportunity 
for a timely hearing after such notice; 
(3) a relatively impartial hearing body; 
(4) an opportunity to produce evidence 
and witnesses on his or her behalf and 
to refute the hospital‘s proferred evi- 
dence; ( 5 )  a finding by the hearing body 
based upon substantial, credible factual 
evidence; (6) written notice of the hear- 
ing body’s recommended decision to- 
gether with the reasons for the deci- 
sion; and (7) an opportunity to appeal 
the decision.sz 
In the skizition where 2fi institution 
It is often more important to accord 
physicians procedural due process. . . 
the denial of procedural falrness is more 
likely to gene* hostility and actual 
litigation by an aggrieved physician. 
doctor may adequately prepare his or 
her response, he or she is entitled to 
know in advance of the hearing the par- 
ticulars of the evidence against him or 
her, including, for example, incident 
reports, references to specific cases or 
alleged deficiencies, and peer review 
recordss3 Medical and administrative 
staff are well advised to collect and 
prepare this information with care and 
to treat it discretely in order to expedite 
the proceedings against the allegedly 
errant physician and to minimize the 
possibility of a lawsuit. 
Hearing Requirements 
The hearing panel can consist ex- 
clusively of physicians or it can be 
composed of both physicians and lay 
persons. It must be composed of impar- 
tial persons. This does not mean, how- 
ever, that the members need be entirely 
divorced from and devoid of prior 
knowledge of the case; rather, the test 
of constitutional impartiality is “good 
faith objectivity.” Thus, persons asked 
to render a decision are not disqualified 
simply for the reason that they had 
prior knowledge of the situation or be- 
cause they participated in the original 
investigation that led to the charges.s4 
The premise is that responsible and 
honest persons within the hospital can 
make fundamentally fair decisions. 
Likewise, the hearing need not con- 
form with the formality and technicality 
of a courtroom proceeding. Hearing 
panels do not have the power of sub- 
poena and they cannot compel the at- 
tendance of witnesses.ss Therefore, 
there is no legal right to confront and to 
cross-examine witnesses unless they 
testify voluntarily. Cross-examination 
ofthose who supply adverse informa- 
tion is not an essential ingredient of due 
process.s6 However, as noted earlier, 
the doctor must be permitted to present 
his or her own witnesses and to refute 
adverse evidence. The burden of proof 
at the hearing may be placed upon the 
physician, but the decision must be 
based uuon and documented by sub- 
stantial, credible e~idence.~’ Further, 
the decision must be based solely on 
evidence produced at the hearing, not 
on knowledge acquired elsewhere. 
Several cases have held that the 
physician is not entitled as a matter of 
law to representation by legal counsel 
at the hearing. New Jersey, however, 
has held to the contrary, subject to rea- 
sonable rules specified by the hospi- 
tal.’* Whether or not to have counsel is 
the physician’s choice: The attorney 
will be allowed to marshall evidence, 
explain adverse material, and present 
argument. In jurisdictions not following 
New Jersey’s rule, the physician 
should be allowed counsel at the hear- 
ing if the hospital’s lawyer is present. 
application for privileges, which must 
be followed by an opportunity for a 
hearing, must be timely. Undue or ex- 
tended “ d e f e d ’  of an application is 
violative of due process. In short, a re- 
fusal to decide or to provide reasons for 
the decision, deprives the doctor of a 
fair hearing. The concept of “funda- 
mental fairness under all circum- 
stances” is the guiding rule. Thus, in 
one case where the by-laws provided 
that a hearing would be held within ten 
days of a request by the doctor (who 
had been notified of his suspension 
from the staff) there was no violation of 
procedural due process when the hear- 
ing was convened I5 days after his re- 
The 5-day delay was insignifi- 
cant since the doctor was not damaged 
or prejudiced by the minor, technical 
violation of the by-laws. 
Generally, the doctor has a right to 
appeal a recommendation of a hearing 
committee to the hospital’s board of 
trustees. The appeal to the board can 
be and should be restricted to review- 
ing whether by-law provisions were fol- 
lowed and whether there was substan- 
tial evidence to support the decision. 
As mentioned earlier, the final decision 
is the responsibility of the board. 
cedure required? As assumed through- 
out this discussion, the physician is en- 
titled to due process when his or her 
initial application for appointment is 
denied or when an existing appoint- 
ment is not renewed, suspended, or re- 
voked. The Joint Commission requires 
such procedures when clinical priv- 
ileges are subject to “curtailment,” as 
well as in cases of suspension or revo- 
cation.60 The meaning and definition of 
“curtailment,” however, is not clear. 
As a matter of practicality, and in the 
interest of maintaining standards of 
The notice of denial of a physician’s 
When is a hearing and review pro- 
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clinical practice, the following should 
not be considered curtailments of a 
physician’s privileges: medical staff 
programs to monitor an individual’s 
professional performance; a letter of 
reprimand or admonition directed to a 
physician; a requirement for consulta- 
tion; or a requirement that a physician 
seek additional training or education. 
In short, peer review and quality care 
monitoring can be implemented with- 
out conducting hearings.6’ To argue 
otherwise would be inconsistent with 
the hospital’s duty to monitor the qual- 
ity of professional practice. In order to 
avoid problems, this dividing line be- 
tween peer review of a physician’s 
practice and curtailment, suspension, 
or revocation of privileges should be 
concisely explained in the medical staff 
by-laws. 
When a physician has a grievance, 
he or she must invoke the hearing and 
appeal procedure provided by the hos- 
pital before going to court. As a general 
principle of administrative law, admin- 
istrative remedies must be exhausted 
prior to seeking a solution to the con- 
troversy in a judicial proceeding. There 
are many medical staff appointment 
cases to this effect.6z 
By the same token, the hospital. 
whether public or private, must follow 
the provisions of its current b y - l a ~ s . ~ ~  
Thus, even iflocal law does not man- 
date that a private hospital grant due 
process to a physician who has been 
terminated as a staff member, he or she 
may obtain a court injunction requiring 
adherence to the procedural require- 
ments set forth in the hospital’s own 
by-laws. As noted earlier, minor, insig- 
nificant deviations from by-law pro- 
visions do not offend the physician’s 
rights. 
A final note is warranted before 
concluding. A physician-employee is in 
a different category from physicians 
appointed to the medical staff. The em- 
ployed doctor is entitled to neither sub- 
stantive nor procedural due process. 
Rather, his or her rights to continued 
employment depend upon the terms of 
the employment contract. Unless the 
contract provides otherwise, either ex- 
pressly or by implication, the employee 
can be terminated, as a general rule, 
without a hearing, without prior notice, 
and without a statement of the reasons 
for the termination.6‘ Similarly, non- 
renewal of an exclusive service con- 
tract for radiology services does not 
require a hearing6’ 
Condudon 
In conclusion, it must be empha- 
sized that judicial review of medical 
staff privilege controversies is limited 
to determining whether the decision of 
the hospital‘s governing board was 
based upon reasonable, non-arbitrary 
criteria and accompanied by the requi- 
sites of procedural due process. When 
there is sufficient, credible evidence to 
support a decision that was reasonable 
in the circumstances, the court will not 
interfere and substitute its own judg- 
ment for that of the hospital’s board. 
As stated by the Court of Appeals for 
the Fifth Cicuit: 
No court should substitute its 
evaluation of such matters for that 
of the Hospital Board. It is the 
Board, not the court, which is 
charged with the responsibility of 
providing a competent staff of doc- 
tors. The Board has chosen to rely 
on the advice of its Medical Staff, 
and the court cannot surrogate for 
the Staff in executing this responsi- 
bility. Human lives are at stake, and 
the governing board must be given 
discretion in its selection so that it 
can have contidence in the compe- 
tence and moral commitment of its 
staff. The evaluation of professional 
proficiency of doctors is best left to 
the specialized expertise of their 
peers, subject only to limited judi- 
cial surveillance. The court is 
charged with the narrow responsi- 
bility of assuring that the qualifca- 
tions imposed by the Board are rea- 
sonably related to the operation of 
the hospital and fairly administered. 
In short, so long as staff selections 
are administered with fairness, 
geared by a rationale compatible 
with hospital responsibility, and 
unencumbered with irrelevant con- 
siderations, a court should not 
interfere.66 
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